Propaganda vs. Reality: Systematic Violations of Inmates’ Rights in Bard “Model” Prison
Introduction
In a TV telephone interview in September 2021, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced the imminent inauguration of a prison complex in Wadi al-Natrun, to be Egypt’s largest and the first of seven or eight similar complexes. He said its inmates would “serve their sentences humanely and decently ... movement, sustenance, healthcare, social and cultural care, and rehabilitation, in a similar system to that of American prisons” and that “no one will be punished twice.”
If these remarks sounded generally promising, the reference to US prisons was not. During the 2020 UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review the US had received more than 50 international recommendations, including that it close its illegal prisons, most of all Guantanamo, and improve conditions in prisons within its territory, reducing overcrowding, for example, and police and prison officials’ mistreatment of prisoners. The US has a notoriously bad record on prisons and punishment, especially compared to other industrialized countries or so-called established democracies.
Three months after the president’s remarks, another prison complex was opened in Badr City with three sub-centers. It was reported that the two new complexes would replace 11 old prisons, containing a quarter of Egypt’s prison population, that would be evacuated and demolished. Soon after, the public utility status of some of the empty prisons, some built 140 years ago, was removed. The ownership of their buildings and land was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the public treasury and registered as the private state property in preparation for their disposal for investment purposes.
A month before Sisi’s remarks, the Ministry of Interior had announced several formal changes to the legal texts on prisons. These were later approved under legislative amendments to the Prisons Organization Law; the Prisons Authority became the Community Protection Sector and “prisoners” were now “inmates” in “correctional and rehabilitation centers.”
At the end of 2021 the Ministry of Interior announced the start of the “trial operation” of the Badr Correctional and Rehabilitation Center as an “integrated security facility.” The prison began operating about six months later, receiving pretrial detainees and convicts from various prisons amid hopes that their detention conditions would improve. The transfer process was not gradual or well considered, as the Prisons Authority did not officially inform any of the detainees or their families about their transfer dates or new locations. Confused families had to ask in multiple places to reestablish contact with their incarcerated relatives.
In the four years during which Badr Prison Complex has been operating, two contrasting narratives have emerged. The government has praised conditions inside the complex in the wake of a handful of official visits. Detainees and their families and lawyers, however, have pointed to dire conditions and the escalation of various forms of violence against them. The new institutional arrangements and new technologies introduced to the prison administration system, now used punitively, have facilitated and systematized violence against detainees. Placement in the new prisons is thus a double punishment, whether detainees are held in pretrial detention without conviction or serving jail terms. At the time of writing, the Badr Complex is depriving many detainees of basic rights such as exercise, reading, and visits, which would require no additional spending, structural modernization, or new buildings, but only a decision.
In September 2022 the families of some Badr Prison Complex detainees complained to the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) about deteriorating conditions, reminiscent of conditions some detainees were held in for periods of up to eight years at the notorious maximum-security at Tora, commonly referred to as “the Scorpion Prison”, completely deprived of visits and medical care. The families’ complaints specified that the detainees were being held in cells that were brightly lit around the clock, under constant surveillance through cameras installed in every cell, in addition to problems with plumbing and exercise areas. Also, some detainees in Badr 3 Prison were denied visits. As complaints proliferated, NCHR member Walaa Gad al-Karim said that the problems were caused by “post-transfer confusion” and that, having sent all the complaints to the Public Prosecution and the Interior Ministry, the council was waiting for their response. Three years have now elapsed since the complaints were sent, and no response from the Public Prosecution or Interior Ministry has been announced.
During the last quarter of 2022, news spread of the death of five prisoners inside Badr 3 Prison, which had received most of the detainees from Scorpion Prison. According to reports, most of the reported deaths were caused by a lack of or inadequate healthcare, including poor or inadequate response during serious health crises. In 2023 and 2024, leaked news and messages attributed to Badr Complex detainees indicated that strikes were being staged and suicide attempts made to protest the poor detention conditions or the very fact of their imprisonment, as some have been in pretrial detention for years without conviction or trial. The Interior Ministry denied the reports without announcing investigations into any of them.
This report is divided into four main parts. The first follows the process of transferring detainees from different prisons to the Badr Complex to understand whether the Ministry of Interior, represented by the Prisons Authority, was administratively prepared for this huge process, whether the new prisons were ready to receive detainees, and how suitable they are for living in by the standards upheld by Egyptian laws and international conventions. The second part examines the prison infrastructure, including the shape and division of cells, based on testimonies received by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) and comparing them to the claims of the Interior Ministry in its promotional films about the “new correctional and rehabilitation centers.” The third part assesses detainees’ living conditions, specifically their ability to exercise their constitutional and legal rights to exercise, food, appropriate healthcare, and communication with the outside world through visits and correspondence, in addition to the impact of the prison’s remote location on their families, especially in the absence of a good transportation network. Finally, the fourth part shines light on the context of the reported strikes and suicide attempts and follows how the competent authorities deal with such reports.
