It’s the big fire.
On 28 January 2011 we watched the flames consume the NDP building, awaiting the announcement of a curfew as a mark of victory. When the army was deployed that night, it was the sign that Habib al-Adli’s state had been broken against the will of those who took to the streets and stayed there, for a day or a bit longer. That morning we saw everything: death, freedom, and the face of truth.
The fact that millions of Egyptians welcomed back the military and the police in order to depose Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood in early July has given the police a regained sense of control and authority. As such, they have returned to the streets in large numbers and, moreover, have been implicated in the shooting deaths of protestors calling for Morsi’s reinstatement.
Recently we visited Idku in the Governorate of Beheira – a beautiful coastal town on the Mediterranean, 35 km east of Alexandria. Idku is primarily a fishing community; the local population of 250,000 has long relied on Lake Idku – a freshwater body – and the sea for its livelihood.
As a lawyer and international expert, Ruben Carranza, the director of the Reparative Justice Program at the International Centre for Transitional Justice, has been working for long years on justice in transitional and post-dictatorship settings. From 2001–2004, he was the commissioner in charge of litigation and investigation in the Philippine commission that managed to successfully recover $680 Million of former Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos' ill-gotten assets hidden in banks in Switzerland, the U.S. and other foreign countries.
An article by Amal Shafik , PhD from Cairo, Egypt, doing research on Health systems in developing countries
Two noteworthy processes appear to be underway in Egypt, both of which have so far eluded the focus of most analyses and commentary on the country. On the one hand, there has been discussion lately in the Shura Council (currently the country’s legislative body) of passing a “transitional justice law” that would supposedly result in the formation of a truth commission and “special courts,” to investigate government agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the Central Bank.
The long-expected devaluation of the Egyptian pound is finally taking place. The pound has undergone its greatest devaluation against the US dollar since the 25 January revolution, falling from LE5.90 to about LE6.60 in a little over a month.
In this context, the pound has hit a historical low against the dollar and the euro since 2003, when the decision of floating the pound was first made. The question raised is why now, and not before, given the constant and continuous decline in the country’s foreign reserves since January 2011?
The Egyptian government has finally concluded an initial loan agreement with the IMF following two years of continual negotiations. The agreement is to be finalised by the IMF board and then signed and ratified by the Egyptian president, who holds both executive and legislative powers following the parliament’s disbanding several months ago. The government hopes that the loan will help to overcome Egypt’s chronic fiscal and financial problems that have become pressing due to the political turmoil following Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011.
The Brotherhood points to the Turkish experience over the past 10 years as a model, but events bring Egypt closer to the Turkey of the 1980s in the aftermath of a military coup